Publications

Abstract

The notion of integration is seen as a necessary and sufficient condition to characterize inter disciplinary research, its “litmus test” (Klein 2017, p. 23) or “differentia specifica” (Schmidt 2008, p. 55). However, this concept is imprecise about what is integrated (what ? ) and by what process (how ? ). This problem of the imprecision of integration modalities is the “Achilles heel of interdisciplinarity” (Repko 2007, p. 7). Responding to the “Call for a Philosophy of Interdisciplinarity” (Mäki 2016, p. 329), this master thesis attempts to inform the philosophy of interdisciplinarity on this issue using the philosophy of biology. In the first chapter, the reasons justifying the search for conceptual tools in the philosophy of biology are explored after defining the philosophy of interdisciplinarity and its object of research. In the second chapter, the range of conceptual tools that the philosophy of biology can offer is presented, i.e. neomechanistic (Craver et Darden 2013), coordinate unity (Potochnik 2011 ; Potochnik 2017), interfield (O’Malley et Soyer 2012) integration account. In the third chapter, the conceptual tools identified are evaluated in the light of the needs of the philosophy of interdisciplinarity to select the most appropriate proposition (i. e. the interfield model of O’Malley et Soyer (2012)) and the criticisms directed at it (i. e. Nathan (2015)) are shown to be unjustified. In conclusion, it is reported that the response offered to critics has the collateral effect of suggesting a new hybrid model combining the normativity of explanatory relevance (Nathan 2015) and the descriptive capacity of the interfield model (O’Malley et Soyer 2012). As a result, there is a need for an empirical exploration of the question of the motivation for integration, a question that goes beyond the tools of traditional philosophy and this master thesis.